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Editorial Note:
The extent of South Africa’s “illegal immigrant” problem continues to confound. Numbers in
the millions continue to be casually thrown around by officials, politicians, and the local and
foreign press. The study on which these millionaire estimates are based has been widely
discredited. But those who are critical of the study and skeptical of the inflated numbers are
unable to come up with alternative numbers. Their response is usually that the extent of
undocumented migration is, by definition, unknowable. True as it might be, this response
unfortunately does not help very much. In this paper, the author attempts to break down the
various categories of irregular migration and employment in South Africa and to assess what is
and what is not known statistically about each. The paper also attempts to develop a defensible
set of estimates about the extent of undocumented migration.
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1.0

Introduction

1.1

There is a widespread belief within South Africa that the number of non-citizens in the country
has escalated dramatically since 1990. Lurid newspaper headlines speak of “floods, “tidal
waves” and “swarms” of migrants flattening the country’s borders. Researchers and officials
give the popular imagery “scientific” and “official” weight (van Niekerk, 1995; Minnaar and
Hough, 1996; Solomon, 1996). Typical is the use of unsubstantiated figures to make definitive
statements about the “cost” of migrants to the country. The Minister of Home Affairs,
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for example, asserted at a press conference in February 1998 that:
With an illegal alien population estimated at between 2,5 million and 5 million, it is obvious that
the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, are further
being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens. The cost implication becomes even clearer
when one makes a calculation suggesting that if every illegal costs our infrastructure, say R1
000 per annum, then multiplied with whatever number you wish, it becomes obvious that the
cost becomes billions of rand per year.
The moral panic engendered by the image of an undifferentiated “flood” of “illegal aliens”
contains many predictable elements. Africa is in chaos and South Africa represents a haven of
freedom, peace and prosperity for the continent’s destitute masses:
Just as the country is trying to get to grips with determining and plotting strategies to
meet its peoples needs and to develop, it faces a deluge of migrants, mainly illegals ...
we are perceived as an island in a sea of poverty, making us a magnet for migration.
These “illegals” supposedly cause crime and run arms and drugs; they use overstretched social,
medical and health services, depriving South Africa’s own citizens; they take jobs and are
responsible for unemployment; the numbers are already overwhelming with floods more on the
way.

1.2

In popular and official (mis)perception, little distinction is made between various categories of
migrant. Migrants tend to get lumped into all-encompassing categories such as “illegal aliens”,
“illegal immigrants” or simply “illegals.” All are seen as immigrants wanting to stay rather than
migrants with a specific and limited purpose. The dominant discourse frames immigration and
migration as problems and threats to be resisted rather than opportunities to be managed.

1.3

Misperceptions and stereotypes do not provide an enabling political environment for
progressive or pragmatic policy initiatives in the immigration area. Since 1994, the South
1
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African parliament has passed over 200 new bills ranging across the social and economic
spectrum. New labour and employment legislation have been at the centre of the ANC’s
policy agenda. However, apartheid-era migration legislation and policy have been slow to
come under the searchlight of executive, parliamentary and constitutional scrutiny.
1.4

Some commentators have therefore described the country’s immigration policy since 1994 as
contradictory and confused (de Villiers and Reitzes, 1996; Reitzes, 1996). It would be more
correct to say that there are profound differences of opinion within the government and an
intense struggle over the best means to deal with what is commonly believed to be a massive
increase in clandestine migration and irregular employment.

1.5

The definition of lawful and unauthorized entry and stay in South Africa is thus still governed by
inherited apartheid-era legislation and bilateral agreements. The 1997 Draft Green Paper on
International Migration proposes a major overhaul of the structure of migration and
immigration governance in the country (Department of Home Affairs, 1997). The 1999 Draft
White Paper on International Migration is similarly far-reaching, if more conventionally
control-oriented in its thinking. Depending on the extent to which the Green and White
Papers becomes policy, the meaning and substance of “legality” and “irregularity” could look
very different five years from now, by the simple expedient of a transformed legislative and
policy framework.

1.6

A wholesale transformation of inherited migration policy is far from inevitable. There is a strong
lobby within government (coming particularly from the Department responsible for managing
migration and immigration) that feels that inherited policy and legislation are basically adequate.
This position is sceptical of most forms of migration and immigration. Resources are to be
poured into controlling unlawful entry and unlawful employment. Employer sanctions should be
vigorously applied and unauthorized migrants rounded up and deported en masse. This
“fortress South Africa” approach best characterizes the drift of migration policy since 1994
(Crush, 1998).

1.7

A definitive analysis of the extent and impact of undocumented migration and irregular
employment in South Africa is complicated not only by the changing parameters of legality,
illegality and irregularity, but by fundamental inadequacies in systems of data collection and
analysis. This is partly an apartheid hangover. As Standing et al (1996: 245) point out, “A
state notorious for its brutal effort to monitor and control labour flows ironically proved itself
incompetent in the generation of basic labour statistics.”

2
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1.8

The migration debate in South Africa is obsessed with the unanswerable question: “how
many?” But neither the post-apartheid state nor researchers have yet developed the capacity
to produce defensible estimates. In the vacuum, cavalier and exaggerated numbers
predominate. What is needed, once a new policy framework is in place, is a systematic and
comprehensive research effort to document the labour market and socio-economic impacts of
undocumented migration and irregular employment in the country and their inter-relationships.

1.9

This paper critically reviews the current state of knowledge about undocumented migration and
irregular employment in South Africa as a baseline exercise. It begins with an overview of the
major causes of the upsurge in migration to South Africa from neighbouring countries. The
paper then examines how the current policy framework impacts upon definitions of irregular
employment and undocumented migration. The next section of the paper looks at various
attempts to provide defensible general numbers of the volume of authorized and unauthorized
migrants in the country. This leads into a discussion of the need for a more refined and
disaggregated understanding of migration and employment. Finally, the irregular employment
matrix developed for the recent ILO/IOM Symposium in the Hague is used to disaggregate the
different forms of migration and irregularity in South Africa (ILO/IOM, 1998).

2.0

Causes of Irregularity

2.1

South Africa has a long history of dependence on migrant workers from the Southern African
region, particularly in sectors such as mining and agriculture. Indeed, without migrant workers
neither industry would have developed at all, nor therefore would South Africa’s modern
industrial economy. The development and entrenchment of the migrant labour system to the
South African mines has been well-documented (Crush et al, 1991; Crush and James, 1995).
That system remains in place.

2.2

South Africa also experienced clandestine movements of migrants from the region, particularly
to agriculture and the urban services sector (Jeeves and Crush, 1997). Prior to the 1960s,
migrants, in effect, came and went virtually as they wished. From the 1960s onwards, the
apartheid state significantly tightened its controls on such movements in an effort to force
employers to hire locally. Irregular employment continued regardless.

2.3

Since 1990, two major changes can be seen in the movement of migrant workers to South
Africa. First, the numbers of migrants coming to South Africa from the region for temporary
employment each year have undoubtedly increased. Second, the number of migrants coming
lawfully and unlawfully to South Africa from the rest of Africa and elsewhere has also
increased, though not to the “flood levels” of popular perception.
3
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2.4

The causes of the escalating migrant movement to South Africa from the region are various and
complex, historical and contemporary. One recent analysis of the South African labour
market concludes that “the elasticity of migrant labour (from the SADC region) may be
effectively infinite” or, at the very least, that the potential labour supply is “enormous and
elastic” (Standing et al, 1996: 61-2). Some of the conditions promoting mobility are specific to
some countries (the aftermath of the civil war in Mozambique for example); others are more
generalized (growing trade imbalances between South Africa and its SADC neighbours,
structural adjustment programmes, domestic economic policy, drought and ecological
degradation). Without a systematic household migration survey in the supplier states, however,
it would be hard to move beyond a general recounting of push-pull factors in explaining the
supply-side pressures for migration.

2.5

A 1997 Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) survey of a representative sample of
migrants in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe shows that South Africa is of little interest
except as a source of employment. The report concludes: “On almost every front – with the
important exception of job opportunities, costs of living and health care – the home country was
perceived equal to or better than South Africa ... and even South Africa’s much-vaunted
democratic reforms would appear to carry little weight” (McDonald et al, 1998:1). Very few
have any intention or wish to settle permanently in South Africa.

2.6

Migrants were also asked about whether they had a job before they went to South Africa on
their most recent visit (Table 1). Over half (52%) replied in the affirmative. This confirms other
findings that indicate that many were repeat visitors to South Africa and would go again. That
46% went without jobs indicates that the perceived likelihood of finding employment was also
high. Many have networks that alert them to employment opportunities or know where and
how to obtain employment.

TABLE 1: JOB PROSPECTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Lesotho

Mozambique

Zimbabwe

Job Before Migrating

69%

43%

22%

52%

Obtained Job in SA

31%

57%

64%

46%

0%

0%

14%

2%

No Answer

Total

Source: SAMP Data Base

2.7

The perception that there are jobs for migrants seems largely justified. Although
unemployment rates for migrants are unknown, they appear to be much lower than the national
4
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average -- estimated at 20-40%, depending on mode of calculation (Standing et al, 1996: 10329). This, in part, accounts for the widespread ground-level perception within South Africa
that migrants are “taking jobs” from South Africans. In the only study conducted to date on
this issue, a sample of Mozambican deportees were interviewed about their employment
experience in South Africa (Covane and Macaringue, 1998). The deportees reported
extraordinarily low levels of unemployment at the time of arrest: 4.2% of men, 5.9% of women.
3.0

Sites of Irregularity

3.1

Clearly, the demand for foreign migrants from certain types of employers is considerable. Why
they should be more desirable than South Africans in a situation of high domestic unemployment
is discussed below. The established wisdom is that legal contract migrants work in mining and
that those in irregular employment are found primarily in commercial agriculture, construction
and the services industry. This would appear to be confirmed by the two SAMP studies cited
above. In the case of Lesotho and Mozambique, mining is, as expected, the major occupation
(Table 2) . Agriculture, construction and domestic service also have good migrant
representation. Zimbabweans, with a somewhat broader range of skills and higher education
levels, are more widely-dispersed, with a significant number in industrial employment.

3.2

The Mozambican survey confirms the pattern for migrants specifically in irregular employment,
but also provides an important gender dimension to the data (Table 3). Two-thirds of men
were in wage employment, but only 45% of women. Women are heavily involved in street
trading. Construction and car repair are the primary occupations for men; domestic service and
shop work for women. Both are well-represented on the farms.

3.3

Irregular employment is also spatially concentrated. In the case of commercial agriculture, the
primary employers are farmers in the border areas with Mozambique and Zimbabwe
(Mpumalanga and Northern Province) with minor concentrations in the sugar fields of Kwazulu
Natal. Researchers have also noted an increasing trend towards the use of long-distance
migrant labour in the fruit and wine industry of the Western Cape. Much of this labour is
domestic, but farmers are also recruiting from outside South Africa, particularly Lesotho. In the
central Free State province, seasonal cross-border movement from Lesotho to work on
vegetable farms is increasing.

5
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TABLE 2: MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA BY SECTOR
Lesotho (%)
Mining
Farmwork

Mozambique (%)

63

40

9

3

6

2

8

14

Construction
Domestic Service

7

9

Mechanic

7

Factory Worker
% Employed

Zimbabwe (%)

8
73

61

Trading

42
8

SMME Owner

7

% Self-Employed

7

8

75

58

TOTAL

73

Note: Actual employment rates are much higher. Jobs with >5% frequency are omitted from the table.
Source: SAMP Data Base

3.4

In the border areas, four types of migrants are employed: (a) residents of border villages in
Zimbabwe and Mozambique who cross to work on farms on a seasonal basis; (b) “stop-go”
migrants who work for a short period on the farms prior to moving on to their primary
destination of Gauteng (Rogerson, 1998). Often, a period of farmwork is the involuntary terms
of “repayment” for assistance in crossing the border unlawfully; (c) Mozambican ex-refugees
living in rural villages close to the Kruger Park and the farming areas. Farmers pick-up,
primarily female, day labour during harvesting from these areas; and (d) resident, core workers
on major commercial enterprises. Estimates of the number of Mozambicans working on
Mpumalanga farms range from 10,000 to 80,000 (which may be indicative of the seasonality
factor). Estimates of the number of Zimbabweans working seasonally on Northern Province
farms have been put at 7-8,000.

6
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TABLE 3: MOZAMBICAN IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
Male (%)

Female (%)

Total (%)

Construction

40.0

0.0

32.0

Farmwork

7.8

7.8

8.1

Mechanic/Panel Beating

9.8

0.0

7.9

Shop/Restaurant Employee

3.3

27.0

7.4

Domestic Service

3.9

10.8

5.3

Electrician

2.6

0.0

2.1

EMPLOYED

67.2

45.6

62.8

Street Vending

2.0

32.4

7.9

SELF-EMPLOYED

2.0

32.4

7.9

UNEMPLOYED

4.0

5.4

4.2

27.0

16.6

25.1

No Answer
Source: Covane and Macaringue (1998).

3.5

Urban irregular employment appears, at this point, to be spatially concentrated in the major
industrial conurbations of Gauteng and the Kwazulu-Natal. In both areas, male migrants tend
to be highly visible in the construction industry; and female migrants in services, including
domestic work. In the Gauteng area, white Portuguese who left Mozambique and Angola in
the 1970s tend to employ Mozambicans in a variety of employment niches. The construction
industry, originally the preserve of Zimbabweans, is increasingly dominated by irregular
Mozambicans recruited in South Africa as casual labour or through an extensive network of
personal and labour-broking contacts (Rogerson, 1998).

3.6

Similar specializations can be seen in the Cape, where Ovambo fishermen from Namibia have
inserted themselves into the local deep-sea fishing industry in Hout Bay, Cape Town. A recent
study of the main migrant communities of that city revealed that 48% of migrants were from
Namibia and 36% from Angola, with a smattering of migrants from countries as far afield as
Ghana, Liberia, Zaire, Rwanda and Nigeria (McDonald, 1998: 22). A growing trend in Cape
Town has been the use of long-distance migrant labour in the city’s booming construction
industry. The workers, primarily Mozambicans, are recruited by labour brokers in Gauteng.

7
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3.7

A new urban-based phenomenon is migrants who themselves “create” irregular employment
through the establishment of SMME’s and hawking operations. A study of migrant
entrepreneurs in Johannesburg found that these small enterprises created an average of 3 jobs
per business (primarily in the retail and repair sectors rather than production) (Rogerson,
1997).

3.8

The other clear spatial-sectoral coincidence of irregularity occurs in the gold mining areas of the
Free State, the east and west Rand, and Evander, and the coal mining areas of Mpumalanga.
Here, legal contract migrants from Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana are
employed in large numbers, as they always have been. These areas also draw other migrants
from these countries; particularly women from Lesotho. Many subsist on the margins of formal
employment or are in relationships with foreign and South African miners and ex-miners.

3.9

The restructuring of the mining industry over the last decade has seen increasing use of subcontractors for service and specialized production activities (Ulicki and Crush, 1998). The
number of workers employed by mine-subcontractors grew substantially from 5% of the mine
workforce in 1987 to 10% in 1994 (and is probably much higher today). Sub-contracting puts
many workers in an irregular situation, generating considerable cost-savings to employers in the
process.

3.10

The obvious conclusion is that employer demand is a major factor in moving migrants across
the border and in providing irregular work once they are in the country. Although a systematic
survey of employers would be well-nigh impossible to conduct, case study evidence suggests
that there is a widespread preference for non-South African workers. Construction companies
prefer non-South African workers who are considered “hard-working and more diligent”,
“excellent workers”, “more disciplined”, “less devious”, “more-skilled and well-behaved” and
“don’t have a chip on their shoulder” (Rogerson, 1998). The usual advantages of irregular
employment (low wages, vulnerability, exploitative conditions) may be at the core of this
preference. Employers also speak of their preference for the work habits of non-South
Africans, their higher basic skills level and the absence of workplace militancy.

3.11

To the present, the state has imposed few penalties or real disincentives for employing migrants
in irregular situations. All of the state’s policing effort is focused on the migrants themselves.
To date the enforcement effort targets employees, not employers. Since 1990, the South
African government has deported 900,000 migrants of which 740,000 (over 80%) are from
Mozambique (Table 4). Deportations reached an all-time high in 1997. There is little
evidence that this policy has a dampening effect on migration. Rather it has spawned a vast
clandestine network of revolving door migration, subterfuge, abuse and official corruption.
8
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TABLE 4: DEPORTATIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-1997
DESTINATION

No.

%

MOZAMBIQUE

738218

82.1

ZIMBABWE

102335

11.4

LESOTHO

33178

3.7

SWAZILAND

10587

1.2

MALAWI

6418

0.7

OTHER SADC

5739

0.6

TOTAL SADC

896475

99.7

OTHER AFRICAN

946

0.1

OTHER GLOBAL

1451

0.2

TOTALS

898872

100

Source: Department of Home Affairs (DHA), Pretoria

3.12

Employers have remained largely outside the state’s enforcement strategy. Legislation is on the
books allowing for punitive sanctions against employers but it has been little used to date. As
Table 5 suggests, the late apartheid state preferred to deport rather than sanction. The postapartheid state has continued the tradition. Whether this is because employees are easier
targets (they don’t go to court) or because the state is realistic about the inefficacy of employer
sanctions is unclear. Certainly recent rhetoric suggests that employer sanctions will shortly
become a mantra in South Africa, as they are elsewhere. Whether they will be any more
successful in dampening the pressures for in-migration remains very much in doubt.

4.0

The New Restrictionism

4.1

Table 6 shows the total number of legal temporary entrants to South Africa by stated purpose
of visit for the period 1994-9. The vast majority of legal border crossings are ostensibly for
business or pleasure. What these figures disguise is the current highly restrictive environment
for access for employment purposes.

9
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TABLE 5: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS , 1988-1996
EMPLOYERS
VISITED

EMPLOYERS
CHARGED

EMPLOYERS
SENTENCED

MIGRANTS
DEPORTED

1988

131582

56

27

44225

1989

77841

14

13

51550

1990

58004

11

2

53418

1991

59078

25

25

61345

1992

54203

37

23

82575

1993

66086

17

17

96600

1994

45719

24

24

90692

1995

68070

73

73

157084

1996

69009

23

23

180713

Source: DHA
TABLE 6: PURPOSE OF TEMPORARY ENTRY TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1994-1999
PURPOSE OF ENTRY
BUSINESS

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

761231

619422

621836

601167

676521

576401

STUDY

29695

31604

39582

45092

51737

50130

WORK

70002

71028

118449

86118

81442

74129

CONTRACT WORK

157589

124764

123342

107681

84755

61443

BORDER PASSES

88448

115250

153004

143964

110608

113053

TOURIST

2674510

3563738

3937989

4185694

4893473

5150930

TOTAL

3781475

4525806

4994202

5170096

5898236

6026086

Source: Central Statistical Service

4.2

In 1996, the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) decreed that no-one could
henceforth change their purpose of visit once inside the country. In a break with past practice,
all applications for work also had to be made outside the country. The DHA stated its reasons
as (a) the “large numbers” of people who wish to work in South Africa who enter on “holiday
visas” and apply for work permits instead; and (b) that such people were prepared “to work
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for lower wages and employers preferred to employ them to the detriment of local labour.”
No evidence is cited to support either of these propositions. Indeed, there is none.
4.3

South African immigration legislation (the Aliens Control Act of 1991, as amended in 1995)
makes no direct provision for temporary employment schemes and group entry of migrants. All
applications have to be made by the individual in the country of origin. All applications are
then referred to the Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria which continues to exercise
enormous discretionary power. The Act unexceptionally prohibits the issue of permanent
residence or temporary work permits if a position can be filled by a citizen or permanent
resident. Departmental regulations prohibit the issue of permits in occupational categories in
which “a sufficient number of persons are available in South Africa to meet the needs of its
citizens.” But how does the DHA make this determination? Recent efforts by two nonpartisan bodies to discover how this system works in practice were unsuccessful (Department
of Labour, 1996; Department of Home Affairs, 1997). The decision-making appears to be ad
hoc and highly discretionary. There is certainly no objective system in place for determining
skills shortages and labour market need.

4.4

The new restrictionism translates into limited opportunity for migrants from the Southern African
region, or anywhere else, to enter South Africa lawfully to work. The DHA claims that
“except for the mining industry, there no longer is a need of recruitment” from the SADC
countries (Department of Home Affairs, nd). Clearly, not all South African employers would
agree with this summary judgement. Even the DHA itself facilitates deals for farmers to access
migrant workers.

4.5

The restrictionist policy applies, also, to skilled migrants from outside the SADC region. The
overall number of new temporary work permits issued has risen slightly since 1994 from a low
base. Still, the total number issued in 1996 was still less than 20,000. In 1996, there were
only about 50,000 holders of temporary work permits in the entire country. Employers
complain bitterly of the difficulties in getting work permits for non-citizens. Policy strongly
favours skilled migrants from Europe and the West. In 1995, 65% of work permits went to
Europeans, 12% to North Americans and only 8% to citizens of the 12 SADC states (Table 7).
Opportunities for migrants to lawfully enter South Africa for work purposes are thus highly
constrained, particularly for the countries from which most migrants actually come; that is,
South Africa’s neighbours within the SADC.

4.6

South Africa does have separate bilateral agreements with a number of neighbouring states
(Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) governing the entry of contract workers
(primarily in mining and to a much lesser extent, agriculture). These are all old agreements
11
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dating back to the 1960s and early 1970s. At the time, the South African mining industry
enjoyed privileged access to non-South African contract labour, privileges not enjoyed by other
employers. Indeed, the industry virtually pursued its own “foreign policy” on migration (Crush
et al, 1991). The treaties allowed for post hoc legalization of undocumented migrants.
However, the DHA sees this as an incentive to clandestine migration. Taken with its belief that
“there is no longer a need for recruitment” of labour from neighbouring states, the system of
legalization was officially discontinued in 1995.
4.7

Thus, the means and mechanisms for lawful entry to work in South Africa by migrants from
anywhere in the world, but especially the South African region, are highly restricted. Indeed,
they have become much tighter since 1994. Only the mining industry and some white farmers
have managed to exempt itself from the new restrictionism, on the basis of arguments that the
DHA is in no position to contest. Other employers, who might well make a similar case for
lawful access to migrant workers from outside the country, are simply precluded from making
the case. Given the evidence of widespread employment of undocumented migrants in certain
sectors and regions, there would appear to be a major contradiction between current state
policy and employer demand.

5.0

A Question of Numbers

5.1

The new restrictionism rests its case on manufactured numbers. Central to the all-pervasive
anti-immigration discourse is the claim that “millions” of “illegal aliens” have entered the country
since 1990. Official are wont to make unsubstantiated and very public “estimates” of the
numbers involved. Analysis shows that the “estimates” have grown in concert with the
escalating moral panic about “illegal immigration” – from around 1 million in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, to as high as 12 million in the last year (Brunk, 1996:6-8; Minnaar and Hough,
1996: 126-8).

5.2

A favoured “method” of calculation involves taking figures that are verifiable (say deportation
figures) and using a multiplier to reach a grand total. Nearly 600,000 people have been
forcibly removed from South Africa since 1994. These figures could indicate that the number
of migrants unlawfully in the country are substantial. However, it is impossible to draw any
simple correlation between deportation figures and the size of the deportable population. First,
the figures reflect the intensity of policing and the resources put into arrest and deportation.
These have certainly increased since 1994 (Minnaar and Hough, 1996: 164). Second, it is
thought that numerous migrants are arrested and deported more than once a year. Third,
Mozambicans, in particular, are easy and cheap targets for the police and are vulnerable to
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arrest and mass deportation. As Brunk (1996) concludes, “it would be foolish to assume that
those arrested form a representative sample.”
5.3

Given that the authorities, by their own admission, tend to target employment sites and the
streets, it would be surprising if the majority of deportees were not working in some capacity.
A recent survey of Mozambican deportees showed that at least 63% were in paid employment
at the time of arrest and another 8% were street vending (Covane and Macaringue, 1998).
Hence, one could justifiably infer that as many as 90,000 Mozambican deportees each year
were working at the time of arrest.

5.4

The state-funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) has developed what it claims is a
“scientific method” for measuring the illegal presence. Every 6 months, the HSRC undertakes
a countrywide door-to-door sample survey which asks: “How may people who are not SA
citizens live in the house around this property?” Extrapolating the answers, the HSRC
concluded that 9.1 million non-citizens were in the country in mid-1994. Subtracting the
number of non-citizens legally resident in the country, the HSRC concluded that around 4.5
million were there illegally.
The basic fallacies in this method are obvious. One the more bizarre by-products came when
the same question was asked at six-monthly intervals. The resulting-time series appears to
show mass movements of foreigners (involving hundreds of thousands of people) around the
country every 6 months and even, since 1995, an apparently massive outflow of 4 million
migrants.

5.5

The 1997 SAMP survey in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe asked questions about
household and community migration of a national sample, but regrettably the data was not
quantified (McDonald et al, 1998). The survey did show quite extensive migrant links with
South Africa. Some 52% of the population had immediate family members in South Africa
(with a high of 70% in Mozambique, and a low of 31% in Zimbabwe). A similar proportion
had friends living or working in South Africa (66% Mozambique, 42% Zimbabwe). As many
as 72% reported community members in South Africa (92% Lesotho, 74% Mozambique, 54%
Zimbabwe).

5.6

A common assumption in South Africa is that all migrants are “illegal immigrants” who wish to
stay (Minnaar and Hough, 1996: 18). The assertion is directly contradicted by the SAMP
survey. Respondents were asked about the likelihood of leaving their country in the forseeable
future to live in South Africa. Only 16% said it was likely or very likely (with a high of 25% in
Lesotho, and a low of 12% in Zimbabwe) that they would go and live permanently in South
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Africa. On the other hand, 45% said it was likely or very likely that they would go and live in
South Africa for a short period (48% Lesotho, 40% Mozambique and 39% Zimbabwe). The
study concludes:
Although cross-border migration is an important part of life for many of the
people ... in the region, and there are clearly a large number of people crossing
the border for various reasons, very few have any desire to move to South
Africa permanently and most prefer their home country to South Africa on key
indicators such as freedom, democracy, safety and access to basic resources
like land and shelter (McDonald et al, 1998: 9).
People were also asked about the length and frequency of their visits to South Africa. In the
case of Lesotho and Zimbabwe only 11% and 7% respectively stay in South Africa longer than
a year. The Mozambican equivalent is a very high 42% but this does not translate into
permanent residence (with only 13% saying they would probably move to South Africa
permanently) (McDonald et al, 1998: 10-11).
5.7

To summarize, although there is considerable circumstantial evidence that the numbers of
people from neighbouring states and elsewhere in Africa who are in South Africa have
increased markedly since 1994, attempts to get at defensible numbers have been woefully
inadequate. While the “numbers game” may seem rather pointless, defensible numbers are an
important counterweight to the politics of media and official exaggeration. The evidence to
hand does suggest that the vast majority of foreign migrants have no long-term intention of
staying in South Africa. Hence it would be fair to assume that if it were possible to arrive at
defensible figures for foreign citizens in the country at any one time, then we would be
measuring a largely migrant population, and migrant by choice rather than by official policy.
Rather than seeking a single figure, however, it is more profitable to break down the migrant
population into constituent categories. A simple distinction between legality of entry and legality
of stay is a useful starting point.

6.0

Lawful Entrants and Stayers

6.1

The migrant population in this category is threefold: (a) skilled migrants on annually renewable
temporary residence visas and work permits (about 60,000 in number); (b) contract
mineworkers entering under the bilateral agreements, mainly in mining; and (c) “special zone”
and contract agricultural workers.
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6.2

The first category is of limited interest to this paper. The second includes all of the 190,000
contract miners recruited by the South African mines, through TEBA, in Mozambique, Lesotho,
Botswana and Swaziland (Table 8). Although the overall size of the mine workforce has
declined considerably since the late 1980s, foreign migrants have more than held their own.
The proportion of foreign migrants in the mine workforce has risen from a figure of 40% in the
1980s to its current figure of close to 50%. Mozambique, in particular, has recently
experienced growth in its mine workforce at a time when most other areas have experienced
substantial job loss (de Vletter, 1998).

6.3

A “special zone” lawful entry system was established recently to assist white farmers in border
areas. Some 3,000 to 4,000 Zimbabweans are employed lawfully on farms in the Northern
Province. Since mid-1996, two “informal” crossings points have been established on the South
Africa-Zimbabwe border. Persons living within 50kms of the Limpopo can obtain 21 day
passes at the border, provided that they remain within 50km of the border. Zimbabweans may
also enter South Africa as recruited workers. With a nominal fee, an identity card and a letter
from a South African farmer, recruited workers enter South Africa to work for periods of 3 to
6 months (Lincoln, 1998). Farmworkers, mainly women, are also legally recruited in Lesotho
(through the Labour Department there) for temporary work contracts in the Free State. The
estimated number is as high as 20,000.

7.0

Unlawful Entrants and Stayers

7.1

The popular image is that South Africa’s 7,000 km-long borders are extremely porous and that
most people unlawfully in the country, also came unlawfully, without proper documentation.
The first assumption is correct; the second probably not. Certainly there are migrants who
cross South Africa’s border by clandestine means, without documentation or with improper
(forged) documentation in order to work or seek work (known locally as border jumpers).

7.2

In media and official discourse, the preferred methods supposedly include climbing over or
under the electrified fence, walking inaccessible footpaths, swimming rivers or dodging lions in
the Kruger Park. Organized smuggling, at least from the region, is not seen as a major
problem. On the Mozambican border, in particular, organized clandestine crossing is certainly
a profitable business. How many people “fence-jump” is impossible to say. The South
African National Defence Force (SANDF) apprehended a total of 47,031 jumpers in 1994
and 1995. Of these, 65% were on the border with Mozambique and 28% on the border with
Zimbabwe. The SANDF estimate that they apprehend 1 in 4 border-jumpers, though how
they know that is a mystery (Minnaar and Hough, 1996: 144). Certainly, it is fair to assume
that most fence-jumpers are seeking or have jobs in South Africa. However, none of the
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circumstantial evidence seems to support “the flood” of popular mythology. There are two
reasons for this – first, the relative ease of lawful entry into South Africa. And second, the
attitude of people towards borders and illegal crossing.
7.3

In the SAMP survey, support amongst citizens of neighbouring countries for “open borders”
was significant with 61% in favour. Yet this did not translate into a blithe disregard for existing
borders. The survey showed significant support for the principles of territorial and border
integrity and the practice of border controls in Southern Africa (McDonald et al, 1998: 12).
Over 80% of the respondents said they would be discouraged from going to South Africa if
they did not have the right travel documents, and 70% said that they would be discouraged if
they thought they could not get in legally (McDonald et al, 1998: 16). These attitudes are
confirmed by actual behaviours. On their last visit to South Africa, 89% had passports and
72% had a visa or permit for entry (McDonald et al, 1998: 14). The relative extent of unlawful
entry, combined with unlawful stay, has thus very probably been grossly exaggerated within
South Africa.

8.0

Lawful Entrants, Unlawful Stayers

8.1

In this category, there are three “populations”: (a) contract workers who enter South Africa
under the bilateral agreements, lose their jobs and then stay in the country; (b) migrants who
enter for a non-work related purpose (such as tourism or study) and are in the country with a
valid residence permit but employed without a work permit or working in the informal sector;
and (c) migrants in the same category but whose residence permits have expired.

8.2

Legal entry to South Africa from neighbouring countries has certainly increased dramatically
since 1990 (Table 9). In 1996, legal border crossings from South Africa’s seven most
important SADC-partners amounted to 3.6 million. If anything these figures are an undercount
since they do not include people who hold multiple-entry “border passes.” They do reflect the
relative ease of crossing into the country. The vast majority of border-crossers take tourist
permits when they enter.

8.3

The tourist or business permit provides a suitable legal camouflage for those intending to work
on entry. The question is how many migrants enter with jobs in hand or employment in mind.
The SAMP survey provides useful purpose-of-entry data for migrants on their last visit to South
Africa (Table 2). Some 67% of lawful entrants from Mozambique entered South Africa for
work-related purposes. The equivalent figure in Zimbabwe was only 29%, with Lesotho at
25%.
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8.4

A related question is how many migrants are still in the country a year after they enter? The
survey showed that only 7% of Zimbabweans and 11% of Basotho, but 42% of Mozambicans
tend to stay for longer than a year in South Africa. It is clear, therefore, that most entrants are
migrants not immigrants. However, some clearly stay longer and even settle. The question is
how many?

8.5

The DHA’s computerized National Movement Control System records electronically all legal
entries and exits from the country. This system allows calculation, at any point in time, of how
many people are still in the country with expired residence permits and, crucially, where they
are from. Table 10 shows that the cumulative number of people still in the country with
expired permits was 658,875 in early 1997 (on 9 March 1997 to be precise). Overstay
figures for the period 1992-1994 suggest that approximately 80,000 per annum migrants
remain in the country on a longer-term basis (it is not unreasonable to assume that the 1995 and
1996 figures have already subsided to this level).

8.6

The total number of “lawful entry, unlawful stay” migrants at the end of 1996 could therefore be
as high as 350-400,000, although this figure should be discounted by an unknown number who
have left the country without going through formal border posts.

9.0

Unlawful Entrants, Lawful Stayers

9.1

This category consists of three main migrant populations: (a) asylum seekers and refugees; (b)
successful applicants for the immigration amnesty of 1996; and (c) undocumented migrants
legalized for work purposes under Section 41 of the Aliens Control Act (mainly farmworkers).

9.2

The last great wave of unlawful entry to South Africa occurred before the end of apartheid, not
after it. In the 1980s, an estimated 350,000 Mozambican refugees fled to South Africa.
Theywere never recognized as such by the apartheid government. Of this number, about
70,000 returned under a voluntary UNHCR repatriation programme in the early 1990s. The
legal status of the remainder is ambiguous at best (de la Hunt, 1998). Officially, any bona fide
Mozambican refugee is considered a legal resident of South Africa under the terms of a 1997
cabinet decision to grant amnesty and residence permits. However, the amnesty has still not
been implemented and the ex-refugees remain in legal limbo; legally present but without the
documentation to prove it. Many have therefore fallen into the deportation dragnet (Johnston
and Simbine, 1998).

9.3

South Africa has faced a new influx of refugees, primarily from Africa and Asia, since it
acceded to the UN and OAU refugee conventions in 1993. Their entry is “unlawful” in that it
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contravenes the Aliens Control Act. South Africa has never had refugee legislation although a
flawed and compromised Refugee Bill is currently before Parliament (Hathaway, 1998).
Refugees seeking asylum in South Africa either enter clandestinely or, as seems most common,
enter the country ostensibly for a lawful purpose (tourism, business, study) and then apply for
asylum later. By early 1998, some 38,143 had applied for asylum under temporary ad hoc
procedures. The backlog in processing claims is considerable and growing. Only 16,282
applications had been processed to that point and a mere 4,934 granted refugee status (de la
Hunt, 1998).
9.4

In 1996, the South African government offered an amnesty (legalization) programme to noncitizens who had been resident for more than 5 years in South Africa (Crush and Williams,
1998). The vast majority of the applicants were Mozambicans (73%) (Table 11). The
eligibility restriction guaranteed that the vast majority of applicants would be refugees from the
1980s. The remainder were a combination of legal and undocumented residents. Many of the
latter had acquired false identity documents and were living in the country as South Africans.

9.5

The other migrants in this category are the so-called “Section 41s.” Farmers employing
undocumented migrants can register them with the local DHA office and receive a “Section 41"
permit. Farmers in Mpumalanga and Northern Province have begun to use the system more
and more. The total is still relatively small (11,000 since inception in 1994) but can be
expected to grow.

10.0

Conclusion

10.1

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the precise character and pervasiveness of
undocumented migration and irregular employment in South Africa. An obvious first step is to
begin to disaggregate the migrant population into its constituent categories. This paper has used
an ILO classification to categorize that population and to analyse what is currently known about
the characteristics and volume of each sub-grouping. Research currently in progress will begin
to fill in some of the major gaps in our knowledge revealed by this exercise.

10.2

In responding to the challenges of increased in-migration, the first priority for South Africa
involves a conscious policy choice. On the one hand, there are those in government
(associated with the DHA and driven by a populist agenda) who argue for continued and
intensified application of existing immigration regulations (deportations, employer sanctions,
denial of basic services to migrants etc.) in an effort to root out all non-citizens and permanent
residents from the labour market.

18

Southern African Migration Project
Dimensions of “Illegal Immigration”
______________________________________________________________________________
10.3

On the other hand, there are voices calling for a revamped immigration system which would
permit greater legal access to the South African labour market by migrants from the South
African region. These range from politically untenable proposals for open borders within the
SADC region, to the highly contentious proposals of the Green Paper on International
Migration for quota-based temporary work schemes.

10.4

Both perspectives were represented on the government’s White Paper task team (as they were
on the Green Paper task team before it.) When those, ostensibly political, choices have been
made and new immigration policy and legislation are on the books, there is a clear need for
inter-departmental coordination on policy monitoring and implementation.

10.5

At present, there is no common or agreed policy vision and no systematic inter-departmental
coordination on implementation. Employer sanctions is a case in point. The DHA views
employer sanctions as a means purely to raise the stakes of employing non-South Africans to
the point where employers will employ locals in preference, thereby supposedly dampening the
demand-side pressures for irregular migration and employment. The Department of Labour, on
the other hand, views employer sanctions as a potential policy measure to be directed at all
employers who violate basic labour standards. Sanctioning of violators will, in this view, raise
labour standards and reduce the irregular employment of non South Africans (and perhaps
increase employment opportunities for South Africans).

10.6

Labour legislation such as the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment
have changed the parameters and paper definition of irregularity fairly substantially. However,
the recency of these Acts means that it is not at all clear to what extent they are being violated
and circumvented. Hence, it is simply too early to tell whether new laws and regulations will
achieve their primary objectives in relation to the control and elimination of irregularity.

10.7

In South Africa, the next 2-5 years, should see a firming up of the overall policy framework
governing migration and immigration. A draconian approach will drive irregular entry and
unlawful stay still further underground and make it even more difficult to develop workable and
sustainable policy instruments for the regulation and elimination of irregular employment. A
more rationale and coordinated approach, focused on employment standards and basic rights,
must begin with a comprehensive labour market survey to establish the extent to which South
Africans and foreign migrants are caught up in irregular employment. The effectiveness of
existing instruments and legislation can then be properly evaluated against the government’s
objectives for a humane, constitutionally sound and non-abusive set of labour standards.
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